CRITICAL: CVE-2026-46043 (CVSS 9.1) — multiple products

CVE: CVE-2026-46043

CVSS: 9.1 (3.1) — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H

Severity: CRITICAL

Status: Critical advisory

Affected

_See vendor advisory_

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv

rxe_rcv() currently checks only that the incoming packet is at least

header_size(pkt) bytes long before payload_size() is used.

However, payload_size() subtracts both the attacker-controlled BTH pad

field and RXE_ICRC_SIZE from pkt->paylen:

payload_size = pkt->paylen - offset[RXE_PAYLOAD] - bth_pad(pkt)

- RXE_ICRC_SIZE

This means a short packet can still make payload_size() underflow even

if it includes enough bytes for the fixed headers. Simply requiring

header_size(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE is not sufficient either, because a

packet with a forged non-zero BTH pad can still leave payload_size()

negative and pass an underflowed value to later receive-path users.

Fix this by validating pkt->paylen against the full minimum length

required by payload_size(): header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) +

RXE_ICRC_SIZE.

Verified Sources

• NVD entry
• GitHub Advisory
• MITRE

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2fd4f8b749309a61c3f3f88ee8891d94f79e1240
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7244491dab347f648e661da96dc0febadd9daec3
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9b924f3a26b21330a837cfe72e819b6393bbeeaa
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e8ee0e792d475b1067c199ef0af1b6221fa6f43d
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f83519a4c122c9c7a850a2197648a9ff4c67c520

_Validated by the Lyrie Threat Intelligence Pipeline — 3 independent sources confirmed before publication. No speculation._